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n Abstract Reproductive-skew theory can be broadly divided into transactional
models, in which reproduction is shared among group members in return for some
fitness benefit, and tug-of-war models, in which reproductive sharing arises solely
from an inability of each group member to fully control the others. For small-colony
social insects in which complete reproductive control by a single individual is plau-
sible, transactional-concession models account, better than any other existing model,
for observed relationships between each of the dependent variables of skew, changes
in reproductive partitioning over time, group size, and within-group aggression, and
each of the predictor variables of genetic relatedness, ecological constraints on soli-
tary breeding, and benefits of group living. An extension of transactional-concession
models via the “workers-as-a-collective-dominant” model potentially offers new in-
sights into some of the most striking reproductive patterns in large-colony eusocial
Hymenopteran species, from the loss of worker capacity to produce female offspring
to patterns of skew and aggression in polygynous societies.
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INTRODUCTION
In the last 10 years, much theoretical and empirical attention has focused on factors
that influence the evolution of reproductive partitioning among members of animal
social groups, in particular on the degree to which reproduction is biased in fa-
vor of dominant breeders (5a, 7, 8, 10, 13, 14, 18, 19, 21, 32, 37, 40–42, 47, 51, 54,
71–75, 77–79, 82, 83, 88, 101, 105–107; HK Reeve & RL Jeanne, submitted for
publication). In both vertebrate and insect societies, there is tremendous variation
in reproductive skew, that is, the degree of reproductive bias in favor of domi-
nant breeders. In high-skew societies, direct reproduction is concentrated in one
or a few dominant breeders in the group; in low-skew societies, reproduction is
distributed more evenly among group members.
The rapidly growing interest in reproductive-skew theories appears to have two
sources. First, evolutionary biologists have realized that a theory that properly
integrates our understanding of the ecological, genetic, and social factors that
influence skew has the potential to apply widely to many animal societies and
even assume the status of a unified theory of social evolution (47, 82). Second, it
has been recognized that a theory of reproductive skew would lay the foundation for
a rigorous theory of group size and within-group conflict (11, 73–75, 80, 84, 102),
ultimately leading to a comprehensive theory that relates all of the major features
of animal societies to their ecological contexts, genetic structures, and internal
power asymmetries (47, 82).
We first briefly describe the major alternative models of reproductive skew and
discuss their major predictions. We then review the results from the first wave
of tests of these skew models in insect social groups and determine which skew
models are the most promising overall. We emphasize that the testing of skew
theory is still in its earliest stages; however, enough preliminary tests have been
performed to begin sorting among the major alternative models.
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MODELS OF REPRODUCTIVE SKEW
Transactional Models
In transactional models of reproductive skew, group members are envisioned as
yielding reproduction to each other (reproductive incentives of various kinds) in
return for specific benefits. There are two main transactional models of repro-
ductive skew, the concession model and the restraint model. These two types of
transactional models differ according to whether the dominant breeder, defined
operationally as the individual controlling group membership, or the subordinate
breeder controls the allocation of reproduction within the group. To simplify de-
scription of these models, we initially consider only two-person groups.
Concession Models
In concession models, the dominant individual fully controls both group mem-
bership and the fraction of total group reproduction that the subordinate breeder
obtains. Concession models attempt to explain the degree of skew by predict-
ing the conditions under which the dominant breeder should yield just enough
reproduction to a subordinate to make it favorable for the subordinate to stay in
the group and cooperate peacefully rather than to leave the group and reproduce
independently or fight to gain exclusive control of the group’s resources. Minimal
reproductive payments that prevent subordinates from leaving are called “stay-
ing incentives”; payments that prevent subordinates from fighting to the death for
complete control of colony resources are called “peace incentives” (82).
The very first concession models for the evolution of reproductive skew an-
alyzed how ecological constraints on solitary reproduction, genetic relatedness
of potential breeders, and productivity advantages of peaceful association should
influence the magnitudes of staying incentives in vertebrate and invertebrate so-
cieties (18, 19, 71,105–107). Reeve & Ratnieks (82) extended these models by
examining how relative fighting ability among group members interacts with the
above factors to influence the reproductive skew via peace incentives.
We illustrate here how the basic concession model (only staying incentives are
considered) is constructed from Hamilton’s rule (30) and the genetic and ecological
variables described in Table 1. The three parameters entering into the basic skew
model for dyadic groups are (a) r, the (assumed symmetrical) genetic relatedness
between the dominant and the subordinate members; (b) x, the expected soli-
tary reproduction by a potential subordinate relative to a lone dominant (i.e. s=d),
with lower values of x indicating harsher ecological constraints on independent
breeding; and (c) k, the overall reproductive output of the dyad relative to a lone
dominant member (i.e. g=d). These variables are then used in combination with
Hamilton’s rule to solve for the conditions under which the dominant breeder
should retain the subordinate breeder or prevent it from joining (because the domi-
nant controls group membership) and under which the subordinate breeder should
stay in the group versus leave.
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TABLE 1 Variables in two-person transactional model of skew
Variable Kind Meaning
s Ecological Subordinate’s solitary reproductive output
g Ecological Group’s total reproductive output
d Ecological Lone dominant’s reproductive output
x Ecological s=d (subordinate’s standardized output)
k Ecological g=d (group’s standardized output)
r Genetic Relatedness between subordinate and dominant
f Social Probability that subordinate wins a lethal fight
Hamilton’s rule for deciding which of two alternative strategies will be favored
by selection has the following form: Strategy i will be favored over strategy j if
.Pi − Pj /C r.Ki − K j / > 0; (1)
which is equivalent to
Pi C r Ki > Pj C r K j ; (2)
where r is the coefficient of relatedness between the two interactants, Pi (or Pj)
is the personal reproduction associated with strategy i (or j), and Ki (or Kj) is the
other party’s reproduction if strategy i (or j) is performed.
In the basic concession model, the proportion p of overall direct reproduction
yielded by the dominant to the subordinate breeder in a stable association is that
which gives the subordinate just sufficient incentive to remain in the association
rather than leave and attempt to reproduce independently. By Hamilton’s rule, this
minimum p can be found by solving pkC r.1− p/k D x C r , yielding the staying
incentive p expressed as a fraction of total dyad output:
p D [x − r.k − 1/]=k.1− r/: (3)
Next we must use Hamilton’s rule to derive the conditions under which it pays
the dominant breeder to retain the subordinate given that the latter receives its
staying incentive. All of the model outcomes are shown in Table 2. If ecological
constraints are strong, corresponding to the condition x < r.k−1/, the subordinate
will stay in the association with no reproduction; that is, p D 0 (maximum skew).
If ecological constraints are moderate, that is, r.k − 1/ < x < .k − 1/, then the
subordinate will receive the staying incentive given by Equation 3. The staying
incentive in the concession model decreases in magnitude (meaning that the skew
increases) as the relatedness r increases, the total group output k increases, and
the solitary output x decreases (summarized in Figure 1). If ecological constraints
are weak, corresponding to the condition x > .k − 1/, the subordinate member is
refused by the dominant and reproduces solitarily (82; Table 2).
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TABLE 2 Evolutionary outcomes in the transactional skew models (staying incentives only)
Subordinate’s share
Context Condition (Concession model) (Restraint model)
Weak ecological x > k − 1 None; dominanta None; subordinate leaves
constraints refuses subordinate voluntarily
Moderate ecological r.k − 1/ < [x − r.k − 1/]=k.1− r/ 1, if x < .k − 1/=rI
constraints x < k − 1 [.k − 1− r x/]=k.1− r/,
if x > .k − 1/=r
(never reaches 0)
Strong ecological x < r.k − 1/ 0 1, if x < .k − 1/=rI
constraints [.k − 1/− r x]=k.1− r/,
if x > .k − 1/=r
(never reaches 0)
aDominant is the individual that controls group membership.
Figure 1 Subordinate’s reproductive share under concession and restraint (transactional) models
and under incomplete control (tug-of-war) models.
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Thus, the general conclusions of the basic concession models are that the skew
should either stay the same or increase as (a) the relatedness r between dominants
and subordinates increases (because a subordinate that is more closely related to a
dominant requires less direct reproduction to be favored to stay and help the dom-
inant), (b) the probability of successful solitary reproduction by the subordinate x
decreases (i.e. for stronger ecological constraints, because a subordinate has less
incentive to leave); and (c) the subordinate’s contribution to colony productivity
k increases (because the larger this contribution, the less the subordinate must be
compensated). No group forms at all if x > .k−1/, a condition that is independent
of genetic relatedness.
Reeve & Ratnieks (82) further showed that peace incentives increase (and the
skew decreases) as the subordinate’s relative fighting ability f increases. Peace
incentives are given at any level of ecological constraints provided that f is high
enough. One important prediction of this model (to which we return later) is that
the dominant and subordinate will fight to the death if k< 1 (i.e. the subordinate’s
presence actually reduces the dyad’s output) and f > x=.1− r/ (i.e. the subordi-
nate’s fighting ability is sufficiently high, the ecological constraints on independent
breeding are sufficiently harsh, and the relatedness is sufficiently low). Thus, the
concession model makes quantitative predictions not only about the partitioning
of reproduction but also about the circumstances under which groups should form
or break up (through departure of the subordinate or lethal fighting), a point that
is often neglected in tests of concession models.
There have been a number of recent extensions to the concession theory that are
potentially quite important for interpreting skew data in social insects. We briefly
summarize the most relevant new developments below.
Dynamic Skew The values of the reproductive outputs g, s, and d, and thus x and
k, should be viewed not as instantaneous parameters, but as cumulative expected
future outputs from a specified moment in time until the breakup of the group
(51, 68, 83). Likewise, the staying incentive should be viewed as the subordinate’s
fraction of present and future total group reproduction, which may change over time
as the expected future outputs change. The importance of this forward looking
view of the skew parameters is illustrated by cases in which subordinates have
some nonzero probability of inheriting the nest and becoming the sole breeder
in the future. When the latter is true, the subordinate’s instantaneous fraction of
reproduction may be quite low even though the cumulative staying incentive is
predicted to be high (51, 68).
Parent-Offspring Associations The concession model presented above assumes
that dominants and subordinates are symmetrically related to each other’s off-
spring. This is not the case when the dominant female is the mother of the sub-
ordinate (e.g. a worker). Reeve & Keller (77) showed that the asymmetry in re-
latedness occurring in mother-daughter associations versus sibling associations
should tend to increase the degree of skew in the former, because daughters will
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often be neutral about whether siblings or their own offspring are produced (but
mothers will always prefer to produce sons and daughters over grandchildren). In
hymenopteran societies, there is an additional twist: A subordinate daughter of a
singly mated mother queen will prefer that the mother produce female offspring
but will prefer to produce the males herself because she is three-fourths related to
sisters but only one-fourth related to brothers (compared with a relatedness of one-
half to sons and daughters). Thus, the worker and queen can be in conflict over male
production, and it is conceivable that there will be a split skew, that is, a complete
skew for female offspring but a partial skew for male offspring when the subordi-
nate daughter demands a staying incentive. A subordinate daughter should demand
a fraction of the female production only if the mother queen is multiply mated.
The Bidding Game The basic concession model has recently been expanded
to encompass the case in which dominants in two or more colonies compete for
the services of a helping subordinate [the “bidding game” (72)]. In such a case,
dominant breeder-subordinate relatedness is not predicted to affect the reproduc-
tive skew, and (in further contrast to predictions of the basic concession models)
the skew is predicted to decrease as the subordinate’s contribution to colony pro-
ductivity increases. The latter effect arises because a greater contribution by the
subordinate makes a dominant member willing to “bid” more for the services of
that subordinate, in the form of an increased staying incentive. In a bidding game,
we expect frequent nest switching by subordinates and low skews.
Partner Preferences Reeve (72) showed that dominants should prefer relatives
as subordinates, given a choice between relatives and nonrelatives in the basic
concession model (subordinates are neutral about the relatedness of the dominant
member if they receive a positive staying incentive). However, in the bidding game,
both dominants and subordinates are predicted to be neutral about the relatedness
of their partner, and a high frequency of associations of nonrelatives should occur;
that is, relatedness is expected to be highly variable (72).
Group Size Johnstone et al (42) extended the two-person concession model to
the difficult three-person case. The central predictions are unchanged, but the
addition of a second subordinate does modify some predictions. For example,
the condition describing the breakup of the group no longer is independent of
relatedness.
Recently, Reeve & Emlen (74) developed a concession model of reproductive
partitioning and group size for N-person groups when (a) expected group output
is a concave (decelerating) function g(N) of the number N of group members
and (b) each of the (N − 1)-equivalent subordinates receives a staying incentive.
The model focuses especially on “saturated” groups, that is, groups that have
grown in size just up to the point where subsequent joining by subordinates is
no longer beneficial either to the subordinates (in parent-offspring groups) or
to the dominant breeder (in symmetric-relatedness groups). Decreased expected
P1: FRK
November 6, 2000 12:44 Annual Reviews AR119-12
354 REEVE ¥ KELLER
output for solitary breeding s increases the saturated-group size and decreases
the staying incentive in saturated groups. Increased relatedness decreases both the
saturated-group size and the staying incentive in saturated groups. However, in
saturated groups with symmetric relatedness, an individual subordinate’s staying
incentive converges to 1− [g.N  −1/=g.N /], where N  is the size of a saturated
group, provided that relatedness is zero or that the g.N / function near the saturated-
group size N  is approximately linear. Thus, staying incentives can be insensitive
to relatedness in saturated groups (especially relatively large saturated groups),
although the dominant breeder’s total fraction of reproduction (total skew) will be
more sensitive.
If group size N is held constant, the staying incentive stays the same or increases
as the ratio of group output at size N to group output at size N− 1 decreases (which
is like k decreasing in the basic concession model), as the solitary output increases
(which is like x increasing in the basic concession model), and as r decreases (again
just as in the basic concession model). However, the predictions become more
complex if staying incentives in differently sized groups are compared, and these
predictions depend on whether the compared groups are saturated or unsaturated or
a mix of both. When there is substantial variation in group size, it is essential that
field workers account for this variation properly in light of the N-person models.
The predicted ordering for saturated-group size in the N-person model is as
follows: parent–full-sibling offspring groups D groups of nonrelatives > groups
of symmetrically related relatives. Strikingly, stable groups of nonrelatives can
form for concave g(N) functions (with per capita output declining with increasing
group size) in the N-person concession model but not in previous models of group
size with group entry controlled by group members and the absence of skew ma-
nipulation by the dominant (29, 36, 74). Stable groups of nonrelatives can form for
concave g(N) functions in transactional-skew theory because dominants in effect
steal reproduction from subordinates in such groups but allow just enough repro-
duction for subordinates to be favored to stay. Another difference between the
N-person concession model and the controlled-entry group size models without
skew manipulation is that the former predicts a negative relationship and the latter
predict a positive relationship between relatedness and group size. A final pre-
diction of the N-person concession model is that symmetrical-relatedness groups
should tend to break up by threatened ejections of subordinates by dominants,
whereas parent-offspring groups should tend to break up via unforced departures
by subordinates.
Reproductive Skew and Caste Manipulation Keller & Reeve (47) suggested
that, in social insects in which at least some workers are reared by the queen, the
queen may affect worker development so as to increase her reproductive skew (see
reference 9 for a discussion of conflict over caste determination). For example,
the queen might effectively reduce the worker’s relative solitary success x or its
fighting ability f by restricting the amount of food the worker receives as a larva.
Crespi & Ragsdale (14) recently modeled this situation and concluded that such
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manipulation will always lead to complete skew. However, their model didn’t
allow for a trade-off between reduction in solitary-breeding success and reduction
in the worker’s contribution to the group; for example, smaller workers may enable
complete skew but they also may be less effective as helpers. Moreover, dominants
may benefit from having their helping workers retain high reproductive potential, if
those workers will later become replacement breeders or disperse to breed upon the
dominant breeder’s death. Finally, opportunities for such extreme manipulation
will be limited between queens in multiqueen societies, because the latter will
have had little or no chance to influence the other’s development, and any attempt
at such manipulation in the adult stage might be easily thwarted by simply leaving
the group. Thus, the prediction that skew will always be complete is overstated.
Restraint Models
In the concession models, the dominant breeder is assumed to control both group
membership and the distribution of reproduction within the group. Johnstone &
Cant (41) recently developed an alternative transactional model of skew based on
the assumption that the dominant controls group membership but the subordinate
fully controls the reproductive shares within the group. This model is called a
“restraint” model because in it the subordinate captures the largest share of re-
production that the dominant will tolerate before ejecting the subordinate; that is,
the subordinate must restrain itself from being any more selfish lest it be forced
to leave the group. Thus, the subordinate’s share, which is essentially a nonejec-
tion incentive given to the dominant, is higher in the restraint model than in the
concession model (Figure 1).
The restraint model is solved by applying Hamilton’s rule to the dominant’s de-
cision to retain versus eject the subordinate and then solving for the subordinate’s
share p0 at which it just pays the dominant to retain the subordinate. Hamilton’s rule
is then applied to the subordinate’s decision to stay vs leave, given that it will re-
ceive the fraction p0. The outcomes are shown in Table 2, using the same ecological
and genetic variables as used in the concession model. If ecological constraints are
strong, corresponding to the condition x < r (k − 1), and if x is sufficiently small,
the subordinate will stay in the group and receive all of the reproduction (p0 D 1);
otherwise, the subordinate provides the dominant with a nonejection incentive.
Importantly, the subordinate’s share of reproduction never falls to zero (com-
plete skew) in the restraint model. If ecological constraints are moderate, that is,
r (k − 1) < x < (k − 1), then the subordinate again will stay in the group and re-
ceive all of the reproduction (p0 D 1) if x is sufficiently small; otherwise, the
subordinate provides the dominant with a nonejection incentive. Under weak
ecological constraints [x > (k − 1)], the subordinate leaves the association volun-
tarily. Thus, the restraint model makes the prediction that groups will break up
via unforced departures by subordinates, whereas the concession model predicts
that they will break up because the dominant has taken some action to remove
subordinates (Table 2).
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The dominant breeder’s nonejection incentive depends on x, k, and r in much
the same way as does the staying incentive in the concession model (and the
verbal logic describing these dependencies is the same). However, this means that
the subordinate’s share of reproduction depends on x, k, and r in ways exactly
opposite to the subordinate’s reproductive share in the concession model. The
subordinate’s share in the restraint model decreases in magnitude (meaning that the
skew increases) as the relatedness r decreases, the total group output k decreases,
and the solitary output x increases (summarized in Figure 1). Thus, the restraint
model makes predictions that are quite distinct from those of the concession model.
Indeed, for sufficiently high relatedness (or high k or low x), the subordinate in a
restraint model is predicted to out-reproduce the dominant.
Tug-of-War Models
The transactional (concession and restraint) models explain reproductive sharing
as the offering of reproductive incentives by dominants to subordinates or vice
versa, and both models assume that either the dominant or the subordinate is
fully in control of the distribution of reproduction. Reeve et al (75) developed
a completely different model for the evolution of reproductive sharing, in which
both dominants and subordinates have only limited control over the allocation of
reproduction within groups, and reproductive sharing simply reflects each group
member’s inability to profitably monopolize the group’s reproduction. In their tug-
of-war models [or incomplete control or “compromise” models (40)], dominants
and subordinates have only limited control over the allocation of reproduction
and must expend effort to increase their shares of the total group output. These
selfish efforts come at the expense of total group output. This model formalizes
what seems to be the most widespread view of the evolutionary significance of
reproductive sharing.
The tug-of-war models predict that, when the relatedness between dominant
and subordinate is symmetrical, (a) the subordinate’s fraction of reproduction
either increases with or is insensitive to the subordinate’s genetic relatedness r to
the dominant, (b) the subordinate’s share of reproduction must exceed that in the
concession-skew model (otherwise the group will break apart), and (c) ecological
factors affecting solitary-breeding success do not directly affect the subordinate’s
share of reproduction (as they do in the transactional models). In parent-offspring
groups, the tug-of-war model predicts no reproduction by the subordinate offspring
regardless of group size for groups containing any mixture of unrelated and full-
sibling subordinates. Thus, both transactional (concession and restraint) and tug-
of-war models predict higher skews in parent-offspring groups than in groups of
symmetrically related individuals.
The tug-of-war model can be seen as predicting a reproductive skew that is
intermediate between those predicted by the concession and restraint models. In
terms of Figure 1, the zone in which a tug-of-war model determines the subordi-
nate’s share is the region between the subordinate’s share of reproduction in the
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TABLE 3 Predictions of the major skew and aggression models. The effect of each
parameter assumes that other parameters and the group size are held constant.
Skew model’s predicted association of variable with skew
Variable Concessions Bidding gamea Restraint Tug-of-war
x Negative None Positive None
k Positive Negative Negative None
r Positive None Negative None or negative
Aggression model’s predicted association between aggression and skew
Transactional Pure tug-of war
Positive Negative
aThe bidding game model also predicts switching of subordinates between nests and lower skews than in concessions
models.
concession model (the lower threshold in Figure 1) and that in the restraint model
(the upper threshold in Figure 1). Figure 1 shows that the concession, restraint,
and tug-of-war models, while distinct, can be viewed as describing solution sub-
spaces for a more general model of reproductive skew, and, indeed, Johnstone
(40) has shown how these models can be stitched together into such a synthetic
model. Nevertheless, we treat these models as distinct and testable alternatives
for explaining reproductive skew in a given kind of group, because they make
different families of predictions about the relationships between the skew in one
kind of group and the ecological and genetic variables pertaining to that group
(Table 3).
Reproductive Skew and Within-Group Aggression
A widespread current misconception is that transactional models predict the ab-
sence of within-group conflict because of the focus on peaceful transfers of repro-
duction (13, 14, 37). On the contrary, one of the exciting features of transactional
models is that they can be used to predict variation in the level of intragroup
conflict, from conflict-free to conflict-ridden societies (11, 73, 80, 82).
A number of quantitative models now exist that predict the relationship between
reproductive skew and the amount of within-group conflict (11, 73, 75, 78, 80, 82).
We do not review these models here (see 73), but briefly describe a model that
is general, simple, and has an intimate connection to transactional theories of
skew. This window-of-selfishness model predicts that the frequency of aggression
(or other forms of conflict) within groups will increase as the gap between the
lower concession threshold and the upper restraint threshold in Figure 1 increases
(73, 78). This gap is the “window of selfishness,” which describes the scope for
conflict within the group, that is, the maximum amount by which one group mem-
ber can increase its reproductive share (e.g. in a tug-of-war) without causing group
dissolution. In other words, the window-of-selfishness model predicts that the
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degree of conflict will be circumscribed by the magnitudes of the reproductive
payments required to keep the subordinate from leaving (or fighting) and the dom-
inant from ejecting the subordinate—this is what makes the model transactional in
nature. When the window is wider, one group member (e.g. the dominant one in
concession models) can forcibly take a greater fraction of reproduction from the
other without losing the cooperation of the latter.
Thus, in the two-person skew model, the frequency of aggression is predicted
to rise as ecological constraints become harsher (x decreases), the subordinate’s
contribution k increases, and the relatedness r increases, that is, as the reproduc-
tive skew increases (73). The window-of-selfishness also has been derived for
the N-person concession model, which predicts that aggression should be minimal
in saturated groups (because the two thresholds in Figure 1 have moved together
to produce a zero-width window of selfishness) and should increase as group
size falls below the saturation size (73). In the bidding game, the window of
selfishness also has zero width, as in the saturated-group N-person concession
model (72).
The window-of-selfishness model will fail if the subordinate’s reproductive
share never approaches the lower or upper thresholds in Figure 1 or if most ag-
gression does not reflect selfish attempts to enhance an individual’s reproductive
share. For example, if most aggression instead reflects threats to leave, fight, or
eject (all occurring in the vicinity of the lower and upper thresholds in Figure 1),
then all of the window-of-selfishness predictions are reversed, because aggression
then should increase as the two thresholds move closer together (101).
The pure tug-of-war model, unbounded by required reproductive incentives,
makes quite different predictions about the level of conflict within groups, mea-
sured by the selfish effort each group member invests in the tug-of-war (75).
The model solutions predict that the subordinate’s selfish effort (e.g. aggression)
should exceed the dominant’s selfish effort and that the total selfish effort will
be negatively related to the reproductive skew. Moreover, the total aggression
will increase as the competitive abilities of group members become more closely
matched. In transactional models, increasing fighting ability of the subordinate
relative to the dominant member can either increase or decrease the window of
selfishness, depending on the ecological conditions.
Summary of Theoretical Predictions
In summary, each of the existing alternative skew models generates a diverse fam-
ily of predictions (and also has different testable assumptions; Table 3). Individual
predictions may be shared by two or more models (e.g. increasing skew as relat-
edness decreases in the restraint and some versions of the tug-of-war models),
but the families of predictions from alternative models are quite distinct. Clearly,
tests of skew models should involve as many predictions as possible within each
distinct family of predictions, because testing only a single prediction, such as the
relationship between skew and relatedness, will often be only weakly informative.
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Moreover, predictions about a relationship between skew and one variable may
depend on the values of other variables. For example, the concession model pre-
diction that skew will increase with increasing relatedness assumes that the social
group is under moderate ecological constraints when staying incentives are given;
under strong ecological constraints, the skew is complete, and no such relationship
is expected. Thus, tests of skew theory ideally should examine all of the ecological
and genetic parameters pertaining to the society. Empirical tests of the alternative
models’ entire families of predictions should permit rapid progress in assessing
which skew models are most applicable generally and in specific cases.
In assessing evidence for the alternative models of reproductive skew, we focus
primarily on predictions of the effect on skew of relative solitary-breeding success
x, relative group output k, and relatedness r. The basic concession model predicts
that skew should tend to increase with increases in k and r and decrease with
increases in x. The restraint model predicts exactly the opposite. The tug-of-war
model predicts that x and k will not affect skew and that increasing r will either not
affect skew or cause it to decrease. The bidding game (a special kind of concession
model) predicts that relatedness will not affect skew, subordinates will frequently
switch between groups, and the skew will be low (Table 3). We draw on the other
predictions of the skew models (e.g. regarding group size or aggression) as needed,
according to the kind of data gathered in each study.
TESTS OF REPRODUCTIVE-SKEW THEORY IN SMALL
INSECT SOCIETIES
To date, most studies that have explicitly tested skew theory have focused on
small colonies of social insects, in which the assumption of complete control
of reproductive shares has appeared reasonable. We review this evidence below
(roughly in descending order of amount of evidence) and later review how the
characteristics of even large-colony social insects can be illuminated by skew
theories.
Polistine Wasps
Cooperative associations of social-wasp queens are ideal systems for testing the-
ories of reproductive skew (71). In social wasps of the genus Polistes, multiple
queens often cooperate in founding spring nests after overwintering (58, 71, 108).
A linear dominance hierarchy develops among these foundresses, and the most
dominant foundress (alpha) usually lays most but not all of the eggs. In the tem-
perate species Polistes fuscatus, the first brood develops into early females, some
of which become workers (which sometime reproduce as replacement queens), but
many or most of which leave the nest to become foundresses the following year
(81). Later broods develop into males and late females, the latter also becoming
part of next year’s pool of foundresses (58, 71, 108).
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In an early comparative analysis, Reeve (71) found that polistine societies tend
to exhibit one of two syndromes: (a) high skews and high levels of foundress ag-
gression or (b) low skews and low levels of foundress aggression (but with frequent
differential oophagy and egg replacement). This trend supports the transactional
theory of within-group conflict, which predicts that low skews will be associated
with low levels of aggression.
According to the concession skew model, a subordinate foundress should re-
quire a smaller staying incentive (i.e. the reproductive skew should be larger), as
(a) the colony’s overall productivity increases, (b) the second-ranked subordinate
(beta)’s genetic relatedness to alpha increases, and (c) beta’s reproductive output, if
it were to solitarily found a new nest, decreases. Reeve et al (83) tested and found
strong support for all of these predictions with a genetic (microsatellite) analysis of
reproductive partitioning within 24 multiple-foundress P. fuscatus colonies from
the same population. Reproductive skew was significantly higher in associations
of full sisters than in associations of cousins and significantly increased (relat-
edness controlled statistically) as nest size, measured as total number of brood
cells, increased. Group size was not a confounding variable because all of the
predictions also held when only two-foundress groups were included in analyses.
In Polistes, the likely major benefit of nest founding in groups is survival in-
surance, that is, increased protection from chance loss of all colony adults before
the first workers emerge (57, 71, 80). Reeve et al (83), using a forward look-
ing, dynamic concession model, showed that the survivorship insurance model
predicts that reproductive skew should increase over the course of the founding
phase, because the survival of a newly established solitary foundress’s nest declines
relative to the survival of an established multifounded nest as worker emergence
approaches. As predicted, the reproductive skew increased as the colony cycle
advanced. Part of the increase in skew over time could reflect the decreasing
probability that a female offspring will become a worker over time (i.e. an increas-
ing value of female offspring), but this is unlikely to completely explain this trend:
It appears that half or more of the early females disperse as reproductives (i.e. the
value of a female less than doubles later on), whereas the subordinate’s share of
the brood decreases by a factor of 7 between production of early and late brood
(moreover, the reproductive value of the earlier females will be increased as the
chance increases that the colony will be destroyed by predators before later fe-
males emerge). Increases in skew after colony initiation also are strongly suggested
by the observed temporal changes in skew in foundress associations of Polistes
annularis (65) and Polistes bellicosus (21).
Aggression between alpha and beta was higher on later nests of P. fuscatus (as
also found in reference 26) and also on more productive nests, the latter also having
higher reproductive skew. Thus, the results indicate that higher aggression is asso-
ciated with higher skew, as predicted by the transactional model of within-group
conflict. The opposite relationship is predicted by tug-of-war models (Table 3),
because increasing subordinate competitive efficiency both decreases the skew and
raises the evolutionarily stable levels of aggression for alpha and beta (75).
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The increase in skew over time sheds new light on the significance of foundress
responses to experimental egg removal in the study species (79, 89). Removal
of female- and male-destined eggs late in the founding phase increased alpha’s
aggression toward beta (the second-ranked subordinate) and especially beta’s ag-
gression toward alpha, but removal of female-destined eggs early in the founding
phase caused a significant decrease in alpha’s aggression and no change in beta’s
aggression. The large drop in alpha’s aggression when valuable early-female eggs
are removed (i.e. when a substantial fraction of the removed eggs are betas) strongly
supports the concession model interpretation that alpha is unwilling to engage in
aggressive egg-laying competition when the beta is at greatest risk of losing her
minimal staying incentive (suppression of alpha’s aggression is associated with a
lack of increase in beta’s aggression). Importantly, the concession model also pro-
vides an elegant explanation for the paradoxical finding that “: : : in early foundress
associations, queens frequently exhibit behavior characteristic of subordinates in
mature hierarchies” (24). The skew data indicated that paradoxical dominance re-
versal occurs at precisely the time when the alpha is peacefully conceding a staying
incentive to the beta. Late in the founding phase, when beta’s staying incentive
is only 7%, alpha and beta appear to openly engage in aggressive competition
to replace the removed eggs in newly emptied cells. Egg removal at this stage
stimulates especially large increases in beta’s aggression not only because of the
enhanced egg-laying competition with an aggressively competing alpha, but also
because beta may be retaliating for losing her (albeit small) staying incentive (79).
In contrast to the above skew patterns for P. fuscatus, skews in P. bellicosus
foundress associations are high overall, higher in larger groups, and inconsistently
(negatively or not) associated with the relatedness between cofoundresses; more-
over, foundress aggression was higher in lower-skew groups (which tended to be
smaller) (21). Superficially, these data appear to support the tug-of-war model,
and, indeed, Field et al (21) interpreted these observations as evidence against the
concession model.
However, these results may be confounded by group size (73, 83) and are com-
patible with the N-person concession model if most (the larger) of the foundress
groups in P. bellicosus (unlike those in P. fuscatus) were close to saturation. Indeed,
79% of the P. bellicosus associations, but only 40% of P. fuscatus associations,
consisted of more than two foundresses. As group size increases for saturated
groups, the staying incentive tends to decrease despite the fact that the window of
selfishness remains uniformly zero (variation in the saturation size among groups
could arise from nest site variation in the group output function). Thus, low or
no aggression can be present in high-skew colonies if the latter are saturated. It
follows that, if only the smallest groups are unsaturated (and thus have a positive
window of selfishness), one would expect higher skew to be associated with both
larger group size and decreasing aggression, as was observed (21).
The latter interpretation of the Field et al (21) results generates a testable pre-
diction: If it is true that most foundress groups in their study population were
saturated, then the overall level of aggression within these groups should have
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been very low. Indeed, the authors noted that overall level of foundress aggression
was very low compared with that of other species (21), exactly as predicted by the
N -person model. It is plausible that groups in this study population were especially
likely to be near saturation, given that the mean number of foundresses is higher
than that typically seen in Polistes populations exhibiting high levels of intracolony
aggression. A crucial test of this idea would be to examine whether groups with
some foundresses removed exhibit higher aggression than intact groups, since such
removal should always increase the distance from saturation and thus the width of
the window of selfishness (73).
The N-person concession and conflict models are supported by other data
from polistine wasps. Removal of low-ranked (principally foraging) workers from
colonies of P. fuscatus causes a significant increase in aggression between the
remaining high-ranked females and the dominant foundress (27). Because re-
moval of workers caused an increase in the distance from the saturated group size
(even if they were unsaturated to begin with), this result supports the prediction
from the N-person model that conflict should increase in frequency as the distance
from saturation increases. Recent evidence also indicates that aggression between
P. fuscatus foundresses declines just after the workers emerge (92). This result
also is predicted by the N-person model, because the emergence of workers must
decrease the distance from saturation and thus reduce the window of selfishness for
dominant and subordinate foundresses (73). Moreover, since the saturation group
size for foundresses is less than that for workers according to the N-person model
(74), the N-person model predicts that subordinate foundresses should tend to dis-
appear after worker emergence (because of their reduced contribution), which is
commonly observed (reviewed in 71). The disappearing foundresses are likely
pursuing new reproductive options, such as nest adoption or usurpation (25, 57).
In addition, the N-person concession model’s prediction of an inverse relationship
between cofoundress relatedness and mean group size is observed across popu-
lations in which both were measured (Figure 2). (Note that the prediction of an
overall negative relationship does not assume that most groups within each pop-
ulation are saturated or even that different populations have the same frequency
of saturation—only that at least some colonies are saturated in some of the pop-
ulations.) However, this relationship by itself is not particularly strong evidence
for the N-person model because it could be generated in a variety of ways. Also
in support of the N-person model is the finding that foundress groups form more
frequently when solitary foundresses have lowered survival probability (71).
Finally, the recent discovery that stable associations of unrelated foundresses
often form in Polistes dominulus (67) supports transactional models of group size
as opposed to models of group size without skew manipulation, because the latter
predict that such nonrelatives should never form when group members control
group membership and the g(N) function is concave [which appears to be gener-
ally true for Polistes (71)]. The similarly high skews in both related and unrelated
foundress groups are predicted by concession models of skew under high ecological
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Figure 2 Relationship between mean foundress group size and mean cofoundress relatedness
measured for each of 10 populations of Polistes wasps [P. annularis, P. bellicosus, P. carolinus,
P. exclamans (Rio Grande and Houston), P. instabilis, P. metricus, P. versicolor (38), P. jadwigae
(103), and P. fuscatus (80, 83)]. Mean cofoundress relatedness was measured as mean relatedness
of fall nestmates under the previously supported assumption that this approximately equals the
relatedness of spring foundresses (38); the latter was measured directly for P. fuscatus (83).
constraints [i.e. as x=(k − 1) approaches 0; see Table 2], so it is crucial to know
the ecological conditions in this population. A high probability of nest inheritance
may also contribute to the uniformly high skews in this species (67). A recent
analysis of patterns of cofoundress aggression in P. dominulus strongly supports
the transactional and not the tug-of-war model of within-group conflict (101).
It is not widely recognized that concession models (but not restraint mod-
els nor tug-of-war models) predict that subordinates that share reproduction with
dominants should have inclusive fitnesses roughly equivalent to the inclusive fit-
nesses of solitary foundresses, because the dominant is predicted to concede just
enough reproduction to equalize these two quantities. This prediction may ex-
plain why applications of Hamilton’s rule to the subordinate joining decision
have generally revealed that the inclusive fitness payoffs for solitary founding
are close to (only slightly above or below) the payoffs for joining as a subordinate
(54a, 57, 58, 66).
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Carpenter Bees (Xylocopini and Ceratinini)
Hogendoorn & Velthuis (37) recently examined how well concession skew the-
ory can explain variations in skew within and between species of carpenter bees
(Xylocopini and Ceratinini), which tend to have only two group members (often a
mother and a daughter). In Xylocopa pubescens, the authors calculated the theo-
retical skew from empirical data both for subordinates that are old females (which
were shown to have lower expected nest-founding success than do younger fe-
males) and for subordinates that are young females. The observed complete skew
for old subordinate females matched the theoretical prediction, but skews also
were complete for young subordinate females, which were observed to share in
reproduction. However, these estimated skew parameters did not account for the
especially high frequency with which young subordinate females are known to
later supersede the older dominant females [i.e. the skew parameters were not
“forward looking” in time (see above)]. Incorporating this effect as in inheritance
models of reproductive skew (51, 68) would likely account for the complete skew
for younger female subordinates.
The concession model is supported by some but not all of the data. In Ceratina
species, subordinates typically obtain a share of the reproduction, whereas in
Xylocopa species, skew is typically complete. Nest material appears to be less
limiting in the former species, supporting the concession model prediction that
skew should tend to decrease as x increases. In X. pubescens, the concession
model correctly predicts that groups should not form in the spring, when the
presence of a guard does not increase the output of a dominant member [x >
(k− 1) D 0]. The positive association between skew and aggression supports the
transactional (73) and not the pure tug-of-war model of intragroup conflict (75).
However, the failure of colony productivity k to predict variation in skew
within a population of Ceratina okinawana is more consistent with a tug-of-war
model. In addition, relatedness by itself did not predict variation in skew in Cer-
atina japonica: Skew was similar in semisocial (same-generation) and eusocial
(dominant-mother–subordinate-daughter) groups, but the highest skews were in re-
versed eusocial (dominant-daughter–subordinate-mother) groups despite the lower
relatedness of the subordinate (the mother) to the offspring of the dominant (the
mother’s grand-offspring) in the latter groups. However, the reversed eusocial
groups probably occur later in the season than do eusocial and semisocial groups,
so the concession model may still possibly account for the pattern of skew if eco-
logical constraints on solitary breeding become harsher as the season progresses
(a testable prediction). In addition, the patterns of skew in carpenter bees suggest
that skew theory for mother-daughter associations should be expanded to account
for changes in reproductive value in females as they age—old mothers may be less
fecund as the season progresses, accounting for reversals in dominance and high
skews in groups in which old females become subordinates. In summary, the data
presented suggest partial support for the concession model and partial support for
the tug-of-war model of skew.
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Halictid Bees
Richards et al (86) found ecologically driven variation in skew within dominant-
parent–subordinate-offspring groups of the halictid bee Halictus ligatus. In a rainy
year with high rates of nest failure (relatively low x), the queen’s reproductive skew
was significantly higher than the reproductive skew in a drier year with lower rates
of nest failure (higher x), as predicted by the concession model. Interestingly, in
the low-skew year, the workers (which frequently are mated) produced many of
the reproductive-female offspring. This is expected under the concession model
only if the queen had effectively mated with two or more males, which was what
the authors found (86).
Multiple-foundress associations do occur in halictid bees (55), but relatively few
studies have examined the relationship between reproductive skew and foundress
relatedness or ecological variables in such associations. In one of the few studies,
Richards & Packer (85) found that foundresses in H. ligatus have very low relat-
edness and that reproduction is shared extensively (worker-worker relatedness is
very low, and subordinates have a high chance relative to dominants of surviving
to the postworker phase of the colony cycle), although the skew is not likely to
be completely equitable. These data appear most consistent with the concession
model, given that ecological conditions appear to be mild (only 12% of colonies are
multiply founded and even workers reproduce in singly founded parent-offspring
groups). Aggression has been seen between foundresses, but primarily in the con-
text of permanent and deadly ejection from the nest, which is suggestive of the
transactional prediction that lethal fighting will be most common when subordi-
nates are least related to the dominant (see above). Finally, per capita productivity
appears to decline with an increasing number of foundresses, so the coexistence
of several unrelated foundresses is more consistent with a group size model that
assumes skew manipulation than with group size models without the latter (74).
The tendency for eusociality in halictid bees to revert to a solitary condition at
high altitudes or latitudes (84) is readily accommodated by the transactional model
of group breakup: At high altitudes or latitudes, the short warm season means that
even the first group of emerging “workers” would do better to overwinter as next
year’s foundresses than to stay and help as workers, that is, x > (k − 1) because x
is so high and k is so low (Table 2).
Allodapine Bees
Studies of Australian allodapine bees (93) suggest that large colony size and large
skew in this group are a derived state that has coincided with increased preda-
tion pressures favoring larger associations of nest-guarding females (including
foundress associations). Skew was assessed indirectly as the frequency of small
females specialized for the worker role and apparently with low reproductive poten-
tial. If genetic studies confirm this expectation, these data will be most consistent
with a concession model because increased ecological constraints (low x or high k)
P1: FRK
November 6, 2000 12:44 Annual Reviews AR119-12
366 REEVE ¥ KELLER
are associated with larger group size and mean lower reproductive shares for indi-
vidual subordinates (within-group relatedness tends to be high, i.e., 0.50–0.75). In
the species with especially large group sizes, the group output function is excep-
tionally convex (i.e. there is increasing per-capita reproduction) up to three to five
individuals, before becoming concave (94), in support of the N-person skew model
predictions (74). Finer resolution of these predictions awaits detailed analysis of
within-population variation in group size and skew.
Interestingly, there is substantial evidence in allodapines that supports the part-
ner choice models of reproductive skew (72). Females prefer to group with rel-
atives when given a choice between relatives and nonrelatives but will nest with
nonrelatives if no relatives are available (e.g. in recently burnt areas), provided
that ecological constraints are harsh (high k or low x) (if ecological conditions are
mild, the model predicts that dominants will be less willing to accept nonrelatives).
Indeed, ecological constraints appear harsh, because two-female groups in these
allodapines have more than twice the output of solitary females (93).
Communal Bees and Wasps
In communal wasps and bees, unrelated females (often a large number) share nests
with other females typically with low or zero reproductive skew, with each female
independently ovipositing and caring for brood (15, 52, 53, 55, 60). For example,
recent genetic and observational data on the communal bees Perdita texana and
Andrena jacobi showed that nestmate females are only distantly related and appear
to contribute relatively equally to total group reproduction regardless of group size
(15, 60). These data support the concession model.
In at least some communal bees, the function g(N) relating group output to
group number is linear (53), allowing immediate quantitative deductions about
group size and reproductive skew from the N-person concession model. Each
individual’s share of reproduction in this model is exactly 1-[g(N-1)=g(N)] for
unrelated individuals (74), which reduces to just 1=N if the group output function
is of the linear form cN, where c is a constant. Moreover, there is no upper size at
which groups saturate.
Thus, the observed zero skew and large group sizes are well predicted by the
concession but not the other models. In addition, the absence of dominance and low
levels of aggression follow from the transactional model of intragroup aggression
(73). [Note that transactional theory predicts when individuals will behave as
dominants, which is often misunderstood. For example, Crespi & Ragsdale (14)
mistakenly asserted that dominance is assumed by transactional models, when all
that is assumed is that one group member exists that conceivably could control
reproductive shares. Whether dominance behavior actually evolves is a prediction,
not an assumption, of transactional theory. Below, we also show that even the
assumption of complete control of reproductive shares by a single individual is not
required for transactional skew models to apply.]
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Burying Beetles
Female burying beetles (Nicrophorus sp.) often cooperate in raising young on
buried carcasses, and they may benefit from these associations by being able to out-
compete fly larvae that are also present on the carcasses (16, 17, 88, 94, 95). These
associations likely consist of nonrelatives, and reproduction is skewed in favor of
the dominant female, but the reproductive skew decreases as the size of a shared
carcass increases. The latter result is most consistent with the restraint transaction
model if a large carcass reflects a higher k, that is, a higher contribution by the
subordinate. In support of the latter interpretation, associations are less common
on small than on large carcasses [in the transaction model, grouping is favored only
if x< (k− 1)] (16, 17, 88). However, aggression is less common on large carcasses
than on small carcasses (17), which weakens a transactional interpretation unless
aggression on small carcasses reflects primarily eviction rather than attempted
enhancement of reproductive shares within stable pairs.
Robertson et al (88) alternatively suggest that the data support what is essentially
a concession model but that on large carcasses the dominant’s ability to control
skew lessens; therefore, these authors propose a combination of the concession
and tug-of-war models. However, a tug-of-war model predicts higher aggression
when skew is lower, whereas aggression appears lower on larger carcasses where
skew is lower (17). Reeve (72, 73) earlier proposed that these data support the
bidding-game model, but it is doubtful whether subordinates can readily switch
from one dominant to another (17).
Founding Colonies of Ants
In many ant species, unrelated queens cooperate to initiate a new colony (4, 43, 97).
These “pleometrotic” associations form when there are high ecological constraints
on solitary breeding (low x; there is typically a high predation risk while queens
search for suitable nesting sites and dig burrows), and there are usually high ben-
efits of grouping (high k) as manifested by the greater productivity and survival
of multiple-female associations. Typically, all queens peacefully contribute to re-
production, although it is possible that some queens produce more eggs and/or
workers before the eclosion of the first workers (3, 4, 44, 87, 90).
The low initial skew is apparently in accord with the concession model, given
the zero relatedness between founding queens, but the strong ecological constraints
(low x and high k), should lead to nonequitable reproductive sharing among group
members. (In addition, ecological constraints should become even more severe
over time, because the energy reserves of queens decrease as they feed the larvae,
thus rapidly hampering their ability to initiate a new colony independently.) Even
more importantly, the first brood consists of sterile workers, so it may not be
obvious how the skew models apply to this early partitioning of a brood among
foundresses (82).
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The proper way to apply transactional-skew (e.g. concession) theory is to adopt
a forward looking view of the ecological parameters and the staying incentive. An
interesting feature of cooperative foundations of ants is that only a single queen
generally survives worker emergence (4, 91). Hence, a single queen will inherit the
colony and monopolize production of new queens and males, with the effect that
the skew is complete from worker emergence onward. This seems to contradict
transactional models and raises the question of why queens peacefully cooperate
until worker eclosion, given that all but one will ultimately have a zero-inclusive
fitness. The answer is that, at the time when queens decide whether to nest alone or
in a group, the expected future inclusive fitness for group nesting is likely higher.
That is, x < .k − 1/ when expected future reproduction is computed, owing to
higher future survival of colonies founded multiply rather than solitarily. Queens
would be favored to stay in such groups even if their probability of becoming the
“winning” queen is only x=k (Table 2). Under such conditions, the queens benefit
from cooperating and not fighting lethally, at least until the eclosion of the first
workers, at which time k likely becomes <1 (as the result of workers taking over
colony tasks previously assumed by queens; see below).
Note that multiple-queen associations will be stable only if there is at least
some uncertainty about which queen will survive until the first workers eclose.
Interestingly, experimental studies in fire ants showed that there was a tendency for
larger-headed queens (as well as the queen losing less weight during the founding
period) to survive more frequently than smaller queens losing more weight, but
the association between these phenotypic attributes and probability of survival was
weak (2). This suggests that there may be a weak dominance hierarchy among
queens, with all queens having a nonzero chance of survival. Thus, cooperation
among unrelated founding queens makes sense in light of the concession model
if the probability of becoming the lone surviving queen is viewed as the staying
incentive. This interpretation nicely explains why cofounding ant queens cooperate
in an apparently peaceful manner until the eclosion of the first workers and why
fights and killing of all but one of the queens occur soon after the worker eclosion.
What remains to be demonstrated is that the probability of becoming the surviving
queen is modulated according to the values of x and k in the ways predicted by the
concession or restraint model or is unaffected by these variables as predicted by
the pure tug-of-war model.
Reproduction in Mother-Daughter
vs Same-Generation Groups
As shown by Reeve & Keller (77), there is considerable evidence that skews are
higher when dominants are mothers of subordinate females than when dominants
are of the same generation as subordinate females, as predicted by transactional the-
ory but also by tug-of-war theory (75). An associated prediction is that aggression
should be higher in sister groups than in (singly mated) mother-daughter groups
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because the effective window of selfishness is zero in the latter (73). Recent studies
of a ponerine ant (Diacamma sp.) show that the queen or gamergate is morpho-
logically just a worker (a queenless caste is absent), but the skew is high regardless
of whether subordinates are full sisters or daughters (50, 104). However, complete
skewing in sister associations is accomplished by aggression, whereas complete
skewing in mother-daughter associations appears to be accomplished peacefully
(possibly via contact pheromones) in accordance with the window-of-selfishness
model.
The Reeve & Keller (77) model assumes that subordinates respond only to their
mean relatedness to the dominant’s offspring. If subordinate workers and dominant
mothers can assess their relatedness to male- and female-destined eggs separately,
workers may gain by selfishly attempting to replace the queen’s sons with their own
sons, even if ecological constraints are sufficiently harsh to create complete skew—
that is, the window of selfishness can be wide for male production even though it is
effectively of zero width for female production (73). This hypothesis accounts for
the behavioral conflicts (and high skews) between queens and daughter workers
in relatively small hymenopteran colonies like polistine wasps and bumblebees
(reviewed in 23, 55, 71) and in ponerine and leptothoracine ants (6).
Differential Oophagy: A Puzzling Phenomenon Illuminated
by Transactional Models
In many if not most of the insect societies with low reproductive skew, dominants
and sometimes subordinates frequently eat and replace each other’s eggs (which
is called differential oophagy) but typically ignore each other while these eggs are
being laid (37, 71). Why don’t group members in these low-skew societies directly
challenge oviposition attempts by others? The transactional models provide an
elegant explanation for this phenomenon. In low-skew societies, the reproductive
payments required by group members for group cooperation should be relatively
large (according to concession theory), and, if direct interference of oviposition
occurs, the benefits of grouping are at high risk of being lost through group disso-
lution (dispersal or lethal fighting). Thus, the prudent selfish strategy is to allow
oviposition by another group member (increasing the latter’s assessed reproduc-
tive share) and then to later remove and replace the latter’s egg (under the guise of
egg inspection or while the opponent is occupied elsewhere). Mutual oophagy is
likely to be evolutionarily stable even if it has no net effect on the skew, because
a restrained, nonselfish mutant would suffer reduced reproduction.
Of course, there are other hypotheses for why differential oophagy rather than
direct challenge occurs. For example, differential oophagy yields a nutritive benefit
without the risk of physical confrontation. However, this hypothesis by itself does
not explain why differential oophagy seems associated with low reproductive skew.
The transactional hypothesis could be tested further by observing whether differen-
tial oophagy changes to direct confrontation as skew increases in the same colonies.
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TESTS OF REPRODUCTIVE-SKEW THEORY IN LARGE
INSECT SOCIETIES
Leptothoracine Ants
In a pioneering study, Bourke & Heinze (8) investigated the factors underlying
variation in reproduction among nestmate queens in the genus Leptothorax, a
group of ants particularly suitable for such studies because of their extreme diver-
sity in social organization and their small colony sizes (relative to those of other
ants). These authors found that the degree of reproductive skew increases with
greater ecological constraints on dispersal, the latter inferred from the amount
of patchiness in suitable nesting habitat (8, 32, 33). This finding supports the
transactional-concession model.
A positive association between queen-queen relatedness and reproductive skew
also was found. In some Leptothorax species, all queens contribute to reproduc-
tion (polygyny), whereas in some others, a single queen monopolizes all of the
reproduction (functional monogyny). As predicted by concession models, the re-
latedness among nestmate queens is higher in the functionally monogynous species
(high skew) than in the polygynous species (lower skew) (8, 32). The association
of high skew with high relatedness is also exhibited between different popula-
tions of the ant Leptothorax acervorum (7) as well as among species of different
genera (75).
Bourke & Heinze (8) also found that higher reproductive skew was associated
with higher levels of within-group aggression, as predicted by the window-of-
selfishness transactional model of within-group conflict. The coupling of low skew
with low levels of within-group aggression is found not only in leptothoracines
but also in ponerines, another ant taxon with typically small group size (62, 102).
Although these data together indicate that high skew is associated with high
relatedness in ants, caution is necessary because data are yet available for only a
few species (or few colonies per species) and the frequency of parent-offspring
associations, particularly in the functionally monogynous species, has yet to be
investigated (which is important because both transactional and tug-of-war models
predict high skews in parent-offspring associations). Moreover, as Heinze (32)
pointed out, high relatedness among queens within colonies might result from high
skew (rather than the reverse) when queens are readopted into their native colony,
as indeed is probably the case in many polygynous ant species (12, 45, 96, 98).
Finally, queen number and other social attributes may be a confounding variable
in these analyses.
An even more crucial issue is the extent to which workers affect the reproductive
partitioning and stability of groups the size of leptothoracine colonies and larger.
For example, many highly polygynous ants reproduce via budding, a process
in which queens and their workers depart from their mother colonies to initiate
new colonies. Clearly, the workers’ genetic interests must strongly influence such
aspects of colony reproduction. We next consider how worker interests should
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influence reproductive partitioning, group size, and conflict within large insect
societies.
The Workers as a Collective Dominant
In very large colonies of ants, bees, and wasps, workers play a key role in determin-
ing both the number of queens and the latter’s relative contribution to reproduction
(49). Moreover, queens get almost all of their food from workers. Because of
their sheer numerical superiority, the worker collective could itself be viewed as a
dominant in such societies, with the reproductive shares within the colony being
distributed according to the workers’ aggregate genetic interests.
Interestingly, the structure of transactional theories of skew is unaltered under
this “workers-as-the-dominant” picture (HK Reeve & RL Jeanne, submitted for
publication). For example, consider a large colony in which there are two queens
symmetrically related by r and a large number of workers acting as a collective
dominant. Assuming for the moment that the workers themselves are nonrepro-
ducing and that they are related on average by r1 to the first queen’s offspring
and r2 to the second queen’s offspring (r1 < r2), the workers should act so as to
maximize their mean inclusive fitness.
r1 pk C r2.1− p/k; (4)
where p is the fraction of reproduction obtained by the first queen (also see variables
in Table 1). It is easy to see that the workers will do best if they treat the second
queen as the dominant queen (who becomes a “virtual dominant”) and give the
first queen only its minimal staying or peace incentive (to keep it from leaving or
fighting the other queen) if retaining that queen is beneficial. Note that only the
concession model should apply in this case because the numerically predominant
workers should control not only the queens’ reproductive shares but also group
membership. The key result is that the magnitude of the first queen’s staying
incentive and the conditions under which this incentive is given and the first queen
retained or ejected are exactly the same as for the basic concession model in which
the second queen is behaviorally dominant to the first queen (Table 2). In other
words, the first queen’s staying incentive is still that described by Equation 3,
where r is the relatedness between queens (this is the relevant r because the two
queens are still the only reproducing colony members).
One can also allow for the possibility that one or more of the workers are
allowed to reproduce by the worker aggregate. For example, suppose there is a
single queen to whose offspring the worker aggregate is (on average) related by rq
and also a potentially reproductive worker to whose offspring the worker aggregate
is related by rw. The worker aggregate will then maximize
rq pk C rw.1− p/k: (5)
The workers will treat the queen as the dominant if rq > rw and the worker as the
dominant otherwise. Again, solutions to the basic concession model apply, with
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the important implication that transactional-skew theory can quantitatively predict
the extent of worker reproduction in the colony, as well as the conditions under
which workers will evict the breeding worker or the queen. fThe latter condition is
[rq pkC rw.1− p/k] < .rq x C rw/; where p is the staying incentive from Table 2.
This reduces to [.rw − rrq/.k − 1 − x/.1 − r/] < 0 or just x > (k − 1) because
.rw − rrq/ > 0.g In summary, the only addition to the basic concession model is
the rule that the virtual dominant will be the individual to which the workers have
the greatest average relatedness.
An important assumption of the worker-as-collective-dominant hypothesis is
that workers can somehow determine their expected relatedness to nestmate queens.
Previous studies of large colonies of ants, wasps, and bees have generally demon-
strated that workers do not favor more closely related individuals within colonies,
for example by using genetically variable cues (reviewed in 46). Hence, workers
may have to use indirect cues to assess differences in their statistically expected
relatedness to queens. For example, when a monogynous colony recruits a new
queen, the latter queen can either be a sister of the workers (if recruitment occurs
from within the nest) or an unrelated queen. If the recruited queen is unrelated to
the workers, the workers should treat the mother resident queen as a virtual domi-
nant. If the recruited queen is a sister, workers should favor their mother for female
production or both male and female production if workers cannot readily identify
the sex of the brood early in the development (see below). Discrimination between
the resident mother queen and the newly accepted queen is possible on the basis
of between-colony odor differences (if the queen comes from another colony) or
differences in age or prior social experiences (if the recruited queen is a sister).
Workers also can indirectly assess their expected relatedness to queens based
on the fecundity differences among those queens. The most fecund queens will
have the highest mean relatedness to workers because they will have produced the
largest fraction of workers. Indeed, workers are able to assess queens’ fecundi-
ties in colonies of eusocial insects (22, 48, 63). Moreover, differences in queens’
fecundities are used as proximate cues by workers to determine which queens
are accepted within colonies. In the monogynous form of the fire ant Solenopsis
invicta, for example, queenless workers will generally retain the most fecund queen
and kill the other when given the choice of two queens differing in fecundity
(22, 48, 91).
We next examine whether the “workers-as-the-dominant” concession model
successfully accounts for variation in reproductive partitioning and queen number
in large-colony eusocial insects. To the extent that this model fails, other (mostly
undeveloped) models will have to be invoked, such as a many-person tug-of-war
model (75).
Partitioning of Reproduction Among Queens
We know of no well-documented case of workers providing staying incentives to
subordinate queens in large colonies of eusocial Hymenoptera. In all species in
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which a queen monopolizes reproduction (e.g. functionally monogynous ants and
ponerine colonies), the dominance hierarchy and partitioning of reproduction arise
after fights between queens. Fights are typically intense until one queen becomes
dominant. Once dominance has been established, workers frequently play an
important role in maintaining the hierarchy and preventing the subordinates from
reproducing. For example, queens of Leptothorax sp. A engage in vicious fights
just after hibernation, until one queen becomes dominant and monopolizes all or
most of the colony reproduction (33). Once the dominance is established, queens
stop fighting, and workers attack and expel subordinates that initiate ovary devel-
opment later in the season. Thus, here is clearly a case in which workers enforce
complete skew.
What is lacking is a case demonstrating that workers actively direct reproduc-
tively valuable resources to a subordinate queen as part of a positive staying or
peace incentive (as opposed to determination of these resource flows strictly by
queen-queen interactions). It remains to be investigated why this is so. One pos-
sibility is that stable associations of queens in the presence of workers and partial
skew in the production of reproductive members together occur so rarely that such
systems simply have not been studied. However, it may also be that workers allow
concessions of staying incentives to proceed strictly via queen-queen interactions,
because, as shown above, the workers and the queen to which they are most closely
related have identical views of how reproduction should be partitioned among the
queens (when the workers themselves do not reproduce). Moreover, it may be that
the workers (unlike queens) do not have sufficiently reliable cues for assessing
the relatedness r between queens that enters into computation of the subordi-
nate queen’s staying incentive (Table 2). The evidence required for documenting
worker-mediated as opposed to queen-mediated staying incentives in low-skew
societies would have to show that, when the virtual dominant from the worker’s
point of view is not the same as the behaviorally dominant queen (in the absence
of worker influence), the reproductive skew is that reflecting worker interests, with
the behaviorally dominant queen becoming the “virtual subordinate” and receiving
only a staying incentive.
Three recent studies have investigated whether reproductive skew correlates
with intrapopulational variation in queen-queen relatedness in species with large
colonies, and the available data do not support predictions of the original con-
cessions model. In the polygynous ant Myrmica tahoensis, Evans (20) found that
skews were near zero independently of interqueen relatedness, which was high
on average (r D 0.58) but quite variable (29% of queen pairs were distant
relatives). Aggression between queens was very low, again regardless of rela-
tedness. Similarly, in Leptothorax ruatus, skew (measured as egg-laying rate)
was low and there was no significant association between skew and queen-queen
relatedness (average r: 0.40, range 0.0–0.7, Ru¨pell, unpublished). The skew in
the production in male and female sexuals was significantly negatively correlated
(r D 0.69) with queen-queen relatedness, in clear contrast with the prediction of
concession models. Similarly, M Hannonen & L Sundstro¨m (unpublished) found
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that skew decreased with increased queen-queen relatedness in the ant Formica
fusca. Relatedness between queens was again relatively high in the later species
and skew between queens relatively small. Overall, these data sharply contrast
with predictions of the original concession models, although variation in other
factors possibly affecting skew (k, x, and group size) apparently was not taken into
account.
Assuming that the above studies do not suffer from confounding variables, they
imply either that intrapopulational variation in relatedness cannot be assessed by
workers or queens; or a model different from the original concessions model, such
as the tug-of-war model, applies. One particularly interesting possibility is that
the bidding game model applies. Workers, in effect, bid for the services of queens
which can move between colonies [a possibility raised by Evans’ study (20)]; the
model predicts that skew and aggression should be generally low and independent
of queen-queen relatedness [which is predicted to become quite variable (72)].
The bidding game requires that there be colony-level benefits to adding subordi-
nates; therefore, it is important to determine whether recruiting new queens in fact
increases colony success.
Worker Production of Males
The workers-as-the-dominant concession model yields the simple prediction that
workers should not produce reproductive females in the presence of the mother
queen, who should always be the virtual dominant with respect to reproductive
female production. This is true because, whatever the mean relatedness r between
the workers and the queen’s female offspring, the mean relatedness between the
workers and another worker’s female offspring will have the lesser value r=2.
[Note from the earlier discussion that this line of reasoning does not necessarily
apply for small insect societies in which a dominant queen must take into account
an individual subordinate’s relatedness to its own offspring (one-half) versus the
subordinate’s relatedness to the queen’s offspring (r). For example, one-half re-
latedness can exceed r if the queen is multiply mated.] Indeed, the data for large
eusocial hymenopteran colonies overwhelmingly supports this prediction, in large
part because workers have lost the ability to mate and thus produce female off-
spring (6, 55, 110). Of course, the latter fact by itself is explained by this prediction
of the workers-as-the-dominant concession model.
The model makes the straightforward prediction that the queen in large societies
will be allowed by workers to produce males as a virtual dominant if workers are
on average more closely related to the queen’s male offspring than they are to
the male offspring of other workers. Thus, in a single-queen society, the workers
should produce all of the male offspring if the queen has effectively mated with
fewer than two males, and the queen should produce the male offspring if she
has effectively mated with more than two males. This is known as worker-policing
theory (69), which now emerges as an important special case of the workers-as-the-
dominant concession model (HK Reeve & RL Jeanne, submitted for publication).
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The theory has received experimental support in honey bees (70) and also nicely
accounts for the finding that worker production of males is rare in honey bees
(Apis) but quite common in stingless bees (Melipona spp.), in which the queen
is singly mated (64). Worker-policing theory also predicts that male production
by workers, even if socially inhibited in the presence of a multiply mated queen,
should occur commonly if the queen should die. There is abundant support for
this prediction in honeybees, bumblebees, and ants (reviews in 6, 55, 77, 110).
In societies with an effective number n of singly mated queens having relat-
edness r, policing theory predicts that male production by workers will occur if
n < (1 C 1=r) (6, 59). Obviously, if the queens are unrelated, the prediction is
that workers should always produce the males. There are surprisingly few data
to test this hypothesis, although worker production of males in the ant Myrmica
rubra is known to occur along with a frequently low relatedness among proba-
bly singly mated nestmate queens (review in 6, 61). Conversely, in colonies of
neotropical swarm-founding wasps, in which there are typically multiple queens
of high relatedness, male production is largely restricted to queens, and workers
are more closely related to other queens than to each other, again in support of the
model (31).
Despite this early empirical support, there are numerous exceptions to the pre-
dictions of the worker-policing theory and thus the workers-as-the-dominant con-
cession model. Bourke (5) found that worker production of males in queen-right
ant colonies occurs mostly in polygynous species (in which relatedness among
queens may typically be low) and infrequently in monogynous species. In partic-
ular, there are numerous ant societies in which there is only a single, singly mated
queen, yet the workers produce none of the male offspring, in apparent contradic-
tion to policing theory (6, 34). Explanations of such cases may have to take into
account other factors, such as potential losses in colony efficiency if workers were
to assume male production as well as performance of colony tasks (6).
However, it is also possible that ant queens actively enhance uncertainty over
the sex of their eggs to achieve complete skew even in male production. If the
workers’ assessed relatedness to each of the queen’s young brood is uniformly
one-half instead of three-fourths for sisters and one-fourth for brothers, owing to
lack of discriminability of brood sex (6, 56), then parent-offspring transactional
models predict complete skew in production of both males and females (77). By
the time that workers can discriminate the sex of a maturing brood, it may not be
beneficial for workers to substitute worker-laid male eggs for maturing brothers
because the latter will have a higher reproductive value (56). The cost of this sexual
deception may be that workers will not be able to optimize the care of a brood of
unknown sex, if the sexes have different nutritional optima (indeed, such a cost
may be especially high in the mass-provisioning meliponines, possibly accounting
for why queens in those species do not benefit from hiding the sex of eggs). This
hypothesis may explain why Bourke (5) found queen-right worker reproduction
primarily in polygynous ant colonies—in the latter, enhancement of uncertainty
of brood sex by queens is less beneficial relative to its costs because reproduction
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by multiple queens by itself will tend to reduce the asymmetry in mean worker
relatedness to male vs female broods.
Worker Control of Queen Number and Identity
The N-person concession model, now with workers viewed as a collective domi-
nant, makes the prediction that there will be a negative correlation between queen-
queen relatedness and queen number (the same correlation also is predicted for
small-colony species). The reason is that the indirect kin-selective benefit a dom-
inant receives from a solitarily nesting subordinate goes up as the relatedness be-
tween subordinate and dominant increases (74). Intriguingly, this is exactly what
is found for multiqueen ant societies (45). Moreover, queen numbers increase as
the ecological constraints on solitary founding increase, also in accordance with
the N-person model (45).
The workers-as-the-dominant concession model also makes quantitative predic-
tions about the conditions under which workers should evict or kill other queens, as
well as which queens should be so treated. A subordinate queen (the queen having
the lesser mean relatedness to the workers) should be evicted and forced to breed
elsewhere if x > (k − 1), that is, when the queen’s contribution k is sufficiently
low and constraints on solitary breeding are sufficiently weak (x high).
In the Reeve & Ratnieks (82) concession model that includes fighting options,
there is another possibility for a reduction in queen number. If the subordinate
queen would actually reduce colony productivity (k< 1), for example because she
is an energy drain and her presence does not benefit the colony, then this queen
would tend to be killed rather than leave the colony provided that f > x=.1− r/.
Here f is the probability that the queen will escape worker execution, a probabi-
lity that could be quite small but should be above zero because there is a chance that
the workers will have mistakenly assessed the other queen as the subordinate. (By
the time the subordinate queen is attacked, immediate injury would likely make the
expected solitary success fall rapidly to zero if it is not already zero, so that even
an injured queen does better by remaining in the colony until the bitter end.) Thus,
workers should be observed to execute the subordinate queen when ecological con-
straints are strong and the relatedness between queens is sufficiently low. A lethal
fight occurs under these conditions because the subordinate does better to risk ex-
ecution by workers than to leave for an extremely low payoff for solitary breeding.
The latter model is in accord with data on queen executions in foundress
(pleometrotic) associations of ants. In most such associations, relatedness be-
tween queens is zero, and workers execute (or participate in executing) all but one
of the queens shortly after worker emergence (4, 35). Such associations typically
form under extreme ecological constraints on solitary breeding, as evidenced by
the high frequency of pleometrotic nest foundation. Once the workers emerge,
the contributions of the auxiliary queen(s) fall dramatically (because workers take
over the colony tasks), and the presence of these auxiliary queens likely yields a
net cost to the colony (k < 1). Because ecological constraints are high, that is,
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x appears to approach 0 especially by worker emergence and relatedness is zero,
the queen execution condition is highly likely to be met [ f > x=.1− r/ becomes
approximately just f> 0]. That is, lethal fighting (i.e. queen executions) will occur
even if the subordinate queen has only a small probability of surviving or somehow
avoiding execution.
In fire ants, workers appear to participate in queen execution only after the
queen hierarchy has become clear and especially after one of the queens has been
damaged in fights with the other queen(s) (1). However, this is not inconsis-
tent with the concession queen-execution model because workers cannot identify
their mother queen directly (1), perhaps because maternal recognition cues have
been suppressed or scrambled (72). The workers’ best option apparently is to
let the queens fight among themselves first, because the queen most likely to win
the fight [typically the largest-headed queen (2)] is also the queen that produced
the most workers (3). Thus, initially allowing the queens to fight actually provides
a mechanism for workers to establish which queen is on average most closely re-
lated to them. The workers then benefit by joining in attacks on the losing queen,
in accordance with the execution model.
The concession-based queen execution model also neatly explains the regu-
lation of queen number in swarm-founding neotropical wasps. Swarms usually
contain multiple queens together with workers (39). At variable times after swarms
establish new nests (and new workers emerge), workers appear to maul and kill
multiple queens, reducing the queen number to very few or even one (28, 39, 109),
creating the pattern called “cyclical oligogyny.” Presumably workers are eliminat-
ing queens to whom they have lower expected relatedness (e.g. as inferred through
differential fecundity if the workers are descended from the queens), although this
needs to be verified. Thus, the condition for queen killing [ f > x=.1 − r/] is
plausibly satisfied given that ecological constraints on independent breeding are
known to be high (x low) for neotropical wasps because of extremely high levels
of ant predation [to which swarming is presumably an adaptation (39)].
Later in the colony cycle, when the queen number has been reduced to one
and the colony is now bigger, new queens are produced that are not killed by
workers but instead leave the natal colony in new swarms. This pattern also makes
sense in light of the concession-based queen execution model; when the colony is
larger, the founding success of new swarms is higher because each swarm can be
bigger, likely causing x to increase and thus f to no longer be larger than x=.1−r/.
Moreover, the mean relatedness of workers to the new queens may exceed the mean
relatedness of workers to the old swarm queens at the time of queen execution.
Such a relatedness increase makes f > x=.1−r/ even less likely late in the colony
cycle, reinforcing the effect of increasing x. Thus, instead of being executed, it
makes sense that the late-season queens readily found new colonies with attendant
workers in swarms according to the leaving condition x > (k − 1).
Finally, the concession-based queen eviction model may explain differences in
the patterns of queen eviction between colonies of stingless bees, which have a
single, singly mated queen, and honey bees, which have a single, multiply mated
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queen (64). In stingless bees, the mother queen remains behind at the parental
colony as one of her daughter queens takes off in the new swarm. However, in
honey bees the pattern is reversed. The question naturally arises in the context
of the concession-based queen eviction model: Is the mother queen the virtual
dominant among stingless bees, explaining why the daughter queen is the one
who leaves (as a subordinate), and is this reversed in honey bees?
In the workers-as-the-dominant view, the virtual dominant is the queen to whose
offspring workers have the greatest genetic value. If the mother queen effectively
mates with m different males, the kin value of the mother queen’s offspring to
workers, if we assume worker sex ratio control, an equilibrial sex ratio, and take
into account the reproductive value of males, is .2 C m/=4m. [The kin value
equals the ratios of investment in males times the relatedness to males times
the mean number of females per male plus ratio of investment in females times
the relatedness to females (59).] If the workers are on average related by r to the
daughter queen, the mean kin value of the daughter queen’s offspring is equal to
r.2Cm/=2.1Cm/ (assuming that most workers in the population are working for
their mother, which the daughter queen will become once she begins producing
her own worker offspring).
Thus, in stingless bee colonies with singly mated queens, m D 1 and r D three-
fourths, meaning that at the time of swarming the queen’s offspring are worth 0.75
to the workers and the daughter queen’s offspring are worth 0.56 to the workers.
This yields the correct prediction that in stingless bees the mother will be the
virtual dominant, and it will be the daughter queen who leaves with the swarm like
a subordinate under the condition x > (k − 1).
In contrast, in honey bee colonies with 12 effective matings by the mother
queen, the mother queen’s future offspring are worth only 0.30 to the workers
on average. For the daughter queen’s offspring to be worth >0.30 (making the
daughter queen the virtual dominant), the mean relatedness r of the daughter queen
to the workers controlling the identity of the staying queen must be at least 0.54.
(The latter threshold relatedness declines as the effective mating frequency m in-
creases.) In other words, the workers in control of virtual dominance (e.g. the
currently dominant patriline of workers in the colony) must have some mecha-
nism of favoring a daughter queen who is their full sister with a probability of
>0.58, if the concession-based eviction model is to make the correct prediction
about which queen leaves with the swarm. The latter calculation shows that such
recognition may be quite sloppy and still lead to elevation of a daughter queen to
the status of a virtual dominant, forcing the mother queen to leave with the swarm
as a subordinate. Genetic studies will settle whether the myriad aggressive and
protective interactions between workers and new queens just prior to swarming
manifest the required level of patriline favoritism. Such nepotism does not appear
to occur in the contexts of queen rearing or swarm membership, but recent evi-
dence suggests that worker nepotism might still influence the outcome of fights
among preswarming queens (100).
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CONCLUSIONS
Despite the fact that tests of skew theories in social insects are still at an embry-
onic stage, our review reveals that some of these theories are already receiving
taxonomically widespread support. Recent authors have suggested that evidence
supporting transactional models of skew is sparse or merely indirect (14, 21), but
our survey indicates that both conclusions are too pessimistic. In small-colony
social insects in which complete reproductive control by a single individual is
plausible, the transactional-concession models overall account better than does
any other existing model for the observed relationships between each of the de-
pendent variables of skew, changes in reproductive partitioning over time, group
size, and within-group aggression, and each of the predictor variables of genetic re-
latedness, ecological constraints on solitary breeding, and benefits of group living.
Our review supplements the conclusions of a concurrent review on the con-
cession model prediction of a positive relationship between skew and relatedness.
Sumner & Isaacs (99) conducted a phylogenetic analysis of the association be-
tween queen-queen genetic relatedness and reproductive skew using data for 13
Vespidae, one Sphecidae, one Apidae, and six Formicidae species. Their analysis
showed a strong positive association between the two variables even when phylo-
genetic nonindependence is statistically controlled, with 13 of the 17 independent
contrasts showing an increase in skew associated with an increase in relatedness.
Although these data provide support for transactional models, some caution is
necessary because some species comprised groups of mother-daughter associa-
tions [which tug-of-war theory also predicts will have high skew (75)], and skew
estimates were likely inflated owing to heightened sampling error in species in
which maternity could be assigned for only a few offspring.
This early success of concession as opposed to restraint models raises the ques-
tion of which assumptions of the latter are typically violated. One possibility
is that the assumption that one individual (the dominant, by definition) controls
group membership and the other individual (the subordinate) controls reproductive
shares may not often be satisfied. For example, the characteristics that empower
an individual to control group membership (e.g. size or age) may also typically be
the same characteristics that empower an individual to control reproductive shares
within the group. In the latter case, the concession model must be more applicable.
The extension of transactional concession models via the workers-as-a
collective-dominant model potentially offers new insights into some of the most
striking reproductive patterns in large-colony eusocial Hymenoptera, from the loss
of worker ability to produce female offspring to patterns of skew and aggression
in polygynous societies. By linking skew theory to worker-policing theory, this
general model suggests new and testable explanations for the apparent exceptions
to policing theory. The expanded concession model also provides a unified expla-
nation for diverse patterns of worker control of queen number and generates many
new testable predictions.
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Testing the assumptions of skew theory, such as the complete-control assump-
tion for small groups, is an important new direction for skew research. For exam-
ple, in cases of shared reproduction, concession models predict that experimental
reduction of the subordinate’s reproductive share (in a way that allows the sub-
ordinate to assess the reduced share) should trigger leaving or fighting by the
subordinate, and restraint models predict that experimental reductions in the dom-
inant’s reproductive share will trigger eviction of the subordinate by the dominant.
Future tests of skew theories also must continue to test the families of predic-
tions associated with each of the alternative skew models and not just focus on
one predictor variable such as genetic relatedness. The skew models are now of
sufficient complexity to generate predictions not only about reproductive skew but
also about group size and within-group aggression, which together expand each
family of predictions. Such expansion should lessen the handling times associated
with tests of the skew models and speed progress toward uncovering the general
principles of social evolution.
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